Ukrainian Crisis, Economic Crisis in Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union by Libman, Alexander
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Ukrainian Crisis, Economic Crisis in
Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union
Alexander Libman
2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63861/
MPRA Paper No. 63861, posted 24. April 2015 09:14 UTC
Ukrainian Crisis, Economic Crisis in Russia and the Eurasian Economic 
Union 
 
Alexander Libman 
alibman@yandex.com 
 
1. Introduction 
Eurasian regionalism, which has been neglected by the scholarly literature for decades, seems 
to be gaining attention in the scientific literature (recent book-length treatments of the topic 
include Libman and Vinokurov 2012a; Vinokurov and Libman 2012; Dragneva and Wolczuk 
2013; Vymyatina and Antonova 2014; Dutkiewicz and Sakwa 2015; LSE 2014, Molchanov 
2015). This is partly linked to the emergence of a new generation of regional organizations in 
Eurasia: the Customs Union (CU) of 2010 and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) of 2015. 
These organizations are frequently discussed today from the perspective of the studies of 
Russian foreign policy (e.g., Rowe and Torjesen 2009; Savietz 2012), economic 
modernization (e.g., Hartwell 2013), internal politics (e.g., Jackson 2014; Obydenkova and 
Libman 2015) and political (e.g., Ismailov and Papava 2010; Moldashev and Hassan 2015a) 
and economic (e.g., Darden 2009) ideologies of post-Soviet countries, as well as changing 
shape of the global politics (e.g., Krikovic 2014). Some studies now put the post-Soviet 
organizations into the broader context of comparative regionalism (e.g., Hancock 2009; 
Moldashev and Hassan 2015b; Börzel and van Hüllen 2015; Dosenrode 2015). The extreme 
changes in Eurasia, associated with the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, have certainly 
contributed to the growing attention to the EEU. At the same time, the crisis itself has massive 
implications for the development of this regional organization. These implications require 
thorough scholarly analysis.  
 The goal of this paper is to introduce a number of observations regarding the change 
of the trajectory of development of the EEU (if any) associated with the crises in Eurasia in 
2014-2015: the political crisis in Ukraine and the economic crisis in Russia. These 
interdependent crises are ongoing as this paper is written (April 2015), and there future 
development is difficult to predict. Still, I attempt to offer a number of conjectures regarding 
the possible future implications of the crises on the EEU. They are based on an (in my 
opinion) highly realistic assumption that both crises are of a long-term nature and will shape 
the development of the region in the years to come. Therefore, also their effects on the EEU 
are likely to be persistent rather than of transitory nature. I should also acknowledge the 
existence of other possible crises or shocks, which could change the development of the EEU 
(for example, changing attitude of China or power shift in countries of Eurasia ruled by 
elderly leaders); these possible unpredictable events in the future could add to the complexity 
of the processes discussed in this paper. 
 The article is organized as follows. The next section presents the status quo of 
Eurasian regionalism and the advancement of the CU and the EEU. The third section looks at 
the political and military crisis in Ukraine and its implications for regionalism. The fourth 
section discusses the role of the Russian economic crisis in this context. The fifths section 
looks at how the crises have affected the major step in the development of the Eurasian 
regionalism – the signing of the EEU treaty in May 2014 – and attempts to offer a possible 
forecast of future developments. The last section concludes. 
 
2. The status-quo of Eurasian regionalism 
Regional integration in Eurasia is not a new phenomenon: its origins can be traced back to the 
collapse of the USSR. However, until recently, the effectiveness of regional organizations 
created in Eurasia remained limited. Most of them could be reduced to a set of ‘integration 
rituals’, when countries signed various agreements often without any intention to implement 
them (Libman and Vinokurov 2012a). Some argue that Eurasian regionalism has never been 
designed to promote integration, being a tool to peacefully resolve potential international 
conflicts associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Olcott 1996). There have been 
some exceptions: the sectoral cooperation in the infrastructural industries in the CIS (Libman 
and Vinokurov 2012b), some elements of cooperation in the Russia-Belarus Union and the 
Eurasian Development Bank, created in 2006 to promote regional cooperation. However, as a 
rule, Eurasian regionalism did not deliver any tangible results. 
 This situation strikingly changed after the Customs Union was established in 2010. It 
was created by the same countries, which already started a customs union in 1995 – Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia, - but this time member states actually complied with their 
commitments. In particular, the Customs Union introduced three innovations. It created a 
common customs code and customs tariff, which became part of the legislation of all member 
countries. It delegated the decision-making in the area of trade to a supranational institution – 
originally the Commission of the Customs Union, and later the Eurasian Economic 
Commission (EEC). And it abolished internal customs checks at the borders of the CU 
countries, thus removing one of the major barriers for trade (Mktrchyan 2013). At the same 
time, the CU provisions did not imply the removal of non-tariff barriers between countries, 
which remained an important obstacle for trade (Tarr 2012). The subsequent Common 
Economic Space agreements of 2012 liberalized the movement of capital and labor and 
introduced some form of macroeconomic coordination between countries.. 
 The fact that the Customs Union has actually been implemented has surprised 
observers and students of post-Soviet regionalism. However, the literature pays little attention 
to the reasons of this development. Most studies, looking at the Customs Union, concentrate 
their attention at the reasons Russia had to support it, mostly discussing the political rationals 
behind the Russian decisions (for example, the willingness to counteract the European 
Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership) (Delcour and Kostanyan 2014). However, 
while this argument may explain why Russian interest in the Eurasian regionalism increased 
(in the past Russia frequently was a reluctant member of regional agreements in Eurasia), it 
does not explain why Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed to join the Union. There are two 
possible explanations one could offer. First, the Customs Union can be seen as an example of 
a ‘crisis-driven’ regional integration: Kazakhstan was massively hit by the global economic 
crisis in 2008, Belarus experienced its own currency crisis, and thus both countries assigned 
higher value to preserving economic ties within the post-Soviet space under crisis conditions 
and therefore supported the CU (Vinokurov and Libman 2014). Second, the CU could have, 
paradoxically, be driven by the fact that the economic interdependence in Eurasia decreased 
as opposed to the 1990s, when the Soviet legacy was still very strong. Libman and Vinokurov 
(2015) suggest that intermediate level of economic interdependence – contrary to the very 
high and the very low one – is particularly conducive for regional integration of non-
democratic states. Still, the functioning of the CU and the logic of formation of this regional 
organization remain under-studied. 
 The CU was less than five years in existence when it faced two serious challenges 
affecting its leading country – the Russian Federation. First, the Ukrainian crisis entirely 
reshaped economic relations between Russia and the West, among other things, resulting in 
the imposition of the EU and US sanctions against Russia. Second, the collapse of the oil 
price massively affected Russian economy, which slid down into recession in late 2014 - early 
2015. For other Eurasian countries, like Kazakhstan, the low oil price also constitutes a major 
risk for economic growth. In what follows, I will discuss the implications of both crises for 
the development of the CU and the way they affected the formation of the next step of 
Eurasian regionalism – the EEU. 
3. Ukraine crisis 
3.1. Internal dimension: risks and gains for the countries of Eurasia 
The reaction of the members of the CU to the Ukraine crisis has been ambiguous. No country 
has openly supported Russian actions in Crimea or backed Russian attitude towards the 
conflict in Donbass. On the contrary, both Kazakhstan and Belarus invested substantial effort 
into positioning themselves as neutral intermediaries in the conflict. Belarus actually 
succeeded in this role, becoming the place where the Minsk agreements, as of now the most 
serious attempt to resolve the conflict, were signed. Belarus has repeatedly indicated its 
willingness to sustain economic ties to Ukraine, in spite of possible Russian economic threats. 
There have been numerous symbolic gestures and speeches by the president Aleksandr 
Lukashenka suggesting the willingness of his country to maintain friendly relations with the 
new Kyiv leadership. Kazakhstani leadership has been less vocal in expressing its opinion on 
Ukraine than the Belarusian one (it could be attributed to simple leadership style differences 
between two countries), but again repeatedly stressed the need for a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict. 
 Generally, there are three main consequences Ukrainian conflict is likely to have had 
in terms of political decisions of Eurasian countries concerning Eurasian regionalism, which 
are discussed in what follows.  
1. The first, and the most fundamental consequence, is that now Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and other countries of the region need to reevaluate Russian actions and behavior. One of the 
key elements of the Eurasian regionalism from the very beginning of its existence has been 
the mutual recognition of the territorial integrity of participating countries. This was a 
necessary precondition for any form of cooperation in Eurasia: the international borders, 
which came into existence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, divided numerous ethnic 
groups. They created large Russian ethnic minorities in many countries, partly with strong 
irredentist sentiments (which have never been encouraged or supported by Russia). In other 
cases (like Belarus) the majority of the population favored various forms of reintegration with 
Russia (in Belarus the Russian language still remains substantially more popular than the 
Belarusian, and was even gaining popularity during the independence, see Zaprudski 2007). 
This situation actually favored the rhetorical regionalism of the 1990s: by engaging in the 
integration rituals, post-Soviet countries pacified their Russian ethnic minorities (and, to some 
extent, larger groups of their population interested in integration), at the same time pursuing 
the nation-building projects (Libman 2011).1 Both Aleksandr Lukashenka and Nursultan 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan have skillfully made the pro-integration rhetoric the key element 
of the strategy they pursued while strengthening their states and their nations (on the role of 
Eurasian regionalism in nation-building see Abdelal 2001; Cummings 2003; Hale 2008).  
Over time, the problem of Russian irredentism became less pronounced; on the one 
hand, post-Soviet countries invested substantial effort into reducing it, but on the other hand, 
members of Russian ethnic minorities left or became assimilated. The reduction of risks 
associated with irredentism and higher perception of security of Russian foreign policy was 
one of the main reasons post-Soviet countries were ready to engage in the more intensive 
cooperation within the Customs Union (Libman and Vinokurov 2015). Still, already the five 
days war in Georgia challenged the stability of the informal conventions Eurasian regionalism 
was built upon. It is not a coincidence that not a single Eurasian country recognized the 
independence of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia; Eurasian regional institutions, in spite of 
Russian effort, did not endorse Russian actions in Georgia (Spechler and Spechler 2009; 
Libman 2011). The war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, however, created a much 
stronger challenge. First, Russia revived a conflict, which was perceived to be dormant or 
even resolved: Crimean irredentism was strong in early 1990s, but hardly played any role in 
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 This approach to regionalism is not unusual: in Africa one of the key principles of regionalism has been the 
mutual recognition of borders, which are as fragile there as in the post-Soviet space. 
the 2000s. Thus, it has been shown that perceived decrease of the risks of irredentism was 
over-estimated. Second, Russia showed a much higher level of involvement abroad than in 
any previous case. Third, Russian leaders – at least in spring and summer 2014 – have 
frequently used the rhetoric of the so-called ‘russkiy mir’, ‘Russian world’ consisting of 
members of diasporas worldwide (Zevelev 2014). This ‘russkiy mir’ concept de-facto created 
ample opportunities for intervention in the internal affairs of any country with sizable Russian 
minorities – i.e., of any Eurasian country. 
These developments obviously became a reason for concern for the neighbors of 
Russia. They decreased the willingness to engage in deeper forms of cooperation with Russia, 
which would make post-Soviet countries more dependent on ties to Russia. They also 
reassured post-Soviet countries that any form of cooperation with Russia should be purely 
economic: no political cooperation should be encouraged or accepted. Kazakhstan has 
followed this principle throughout the discussion on the Eurasian Economic Union and has 
adamantly insisted on its implementation in the final treaty. 
2. At the same time, Ukrainian crisis created substantial problems for purely economic 
cooperation as well. To some extent, they were caused by the Western sanctions: now it 
became substantially more difficult to develop economic ties to Russia and at the same time 
to attract foreign partners. While the current (April 2015) level of sanctions does not have any 
direct consequences for the economic interaction of Eurasian countries, some forms of 
sanctions under discussion (for example, the exclusion of Russian banks from the 
international payment systems) would affect the Eurasian monetary settlements as well. The 
early forms of Eurasian regionalism in the 1990s included the idea of a payment union, 
necessary because of the lack of convertibility of Eurasian currencies. Since most Eurasian 
countries created functioning monetary systems, the idea of a payment union became 
obsolete. However, if Russia faced major Western sanctions in this respect, it would require 
substantial adjustment from the Eurasian countries. It is worth noticing that Russia intensified 
the discussion of a currency union in Eurasia – an idea, which due to economic and political 
factors appears to be entirely unrealistic. 
A more serious risk is associated with unilateral actions of Russia attempting to 
impose sanctions on other post-Soviet countries (Ukraine or Moldova) or apply counter-
sanctions on the EU and the US. To some extent, Russia is using non-tariff measures (e.g., 
sanitary regulations) to introduce these sanctions. This is not a violation of the CU principles 
in form, although certainly a violation of the spirit of a customs union. However, Russia often 
mentions the opportunity of introduction of customs tariffs against Ukraine, if the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) this country signed with the EU were 
implemented. Belarus and Kazakhstan refused to support these customs tariffs – party to 
avoid the escalation of the conflict, and party (in case of Belarus) for purely economic reasons 
(Libman 2015b). Russia made it clear that it is ready to implement the restrictions 
unilaterally, which would be at odds with the Customs Union.  
The food sanctions against the EU resulted in one of the most serious conflicts within 
the Customs Union. These sanctions, again, are a serious violation of the spirit of the CU 
(Knobel 2015). After the sanctions were introduced, there appears to be a massive increase of 
smuggling activity from the EU to Russia, using Belarus as the point of entry (Telegina 
2015). Russia attempted to limit these informal and semi-formal imports, re-introducing 
checks at the Belarus border. It claimed to be particularly concerned with the transit of goods 
from Belarus to Kazakhstan. Belarusian leadership reacted with open dissatisfaction (Dobbs 
2015). In addition to rhetoric, it responded with introducing its own restrictive measures, de-
facto restoring customs control at the joint border and even blocking transit goods from 
Kaliningrad enclave to Russia. The conflict has never been fully resolved.  
The fact that a leading country of an international organization violates the agreements 
in case it pursues certain matters to be of crucial importance is not new. Stone (2011) 
develops the theory of informal governance in regional organizations focusing on what he 
refers to as ‘manipulation’: the risk of abuse of the existing framework by the leading country. 
The key parameters are in this case the likelihood and the scope of this abuse. After the 
Ukrainian crisis, first, the likelihood of Russian unilateral actions became higher, since the 
ongoing conflict with the West remains an ultimate priority for the Russian leaders. Second, 
the scope of issues, which are attributed to this most sensitive area, also became larger. The 
economic relations between Russia and the West are now highly politicized and could 
become subject to mutual sanctions and counter-sanctions.2 Also, Russian economic policy 
became more prone to protectionism (Libman 2014), also because of the economic crisis 
(which will be discussed in what follows). These developments increase the risks of non-
compliance by Russia, which jeopardize the entire construction of the Eurasian regionalism 
and of the Customs Union. 
3. While the previous two effects seem to have a negative influence on the prospects 
of the Eurasian regionalism, the third effect is not necessarily a problem for the future of the 
EEU. Under the current circumstances, Russia probably assigns higher value to keeping 
friendly relations to countries it is still capable to. It is also more interested in preserving the 
EEU for its symbolic importance: the existence of the EEU is perceived by the Russian 
leadership as a sign of Russian importance in the international relations and as an indication 
that the effort of the West to isolate Russia internationally does not succeed (another 
international grouping, which is valued by Russia for the same reasons, is the BRICS). The 
EEU has been an important element of the political program Putin suggested for his third term 
as the president; under the current circumstances its importance seems to go up. Therefore, 
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 It is worth acknowledging that it were the Western countries that started this politicization by focusing on 
sanctions as a response to the Ukrainian crisis. 
Russia is likely to be more willing to make further concessions to the EEU countries to keep 
them in the Union (at least, at the level of formal agreements and integration rhetoric).  
So far, the most obvious example of these new concessions has been Russian position 
towards regulating the oil export to Belarus. Crude oil exports have been one of the 
controversial issues in the development of the Eurasian regionalism for the last decade. 
Belarus is interested in obtaining Russian crude oil for its oil refineries, which mostly export 
their production to Europe. Russia, however, imposes export duties on crude oil to protect its 
own oil refineries. As a result, Belarus has always considered the abolition of these duties or 
the redistribution of the revenue from the duties as a precondition for any further integration 
steps. This issue has played a major role when the CU was initiated in 2010. In 2014, Belarus 
again put similar request, threatening not to sign the EEU treaty in May if its conditions were 
not fulfilled. The result of these negotiations has been a new settlement, giving Belarus 
substantial access to the revenue from oil duties. As for Kazakhstan, probably, the most 
significant evidence in favor of its growing bargaining power has been its ability to block the 
inclusion of any political aspects in the EEU treaty, which was originally supported by 
Russia. Even relatively harmless and symbolic institutions typically existing in most 
international organizations (like an inter-parliamentary assembly) were not established within 
the EEU due to a firm position of Kazakhstan. 
 
3.2. External dimension: an EU-EEU dialogue? 
In addition to the effects described above, which had a direct influence on the behavior of 
Eurasian countries and their attitude towards regionalism, there is also an important external 
dimension, which came into existence as the result of the Ukrainian crisis: the possibility of 
negotiations between the EU and the EEU, which is now seriously discussed in Europe.. 
 The Eurasian regionalism has been a rare instance of regional economic cooperation, 
which has been almost entirely ignored by the European Union. While in most parts of the 
world the EU has eagerly promoted regionalism (Börzel and Risse 2009) (in fact, 
strengthening regional cooperation across the countries of the Eastern Partnership has also 
been one of the objectives of the EU), in Eurasia the EU did not demonstrate any interest in 
dialogue with the regional organizations (Libman and Furman 2015). It is difficult to provide 
a clear explanation to this attitude: it could be linked to the purely legal aspects (the EU is 
unable to conduct free trade negotiations with countries or alliances, which do not belong to 
the WTO – while Russia is a member of this organization, Belarus and Kazakhstan are not), 
to the perception of Eurasian regionalism as ‘disappearing’ and thus irrelevant legacy of the 
Soviet era or as a tool of Russian imperialism, or to the willingness to avoid competition in 
shaping the EU neighborhood. In any case, before 2014 any form of dialogue between the EU 
and the Eurasian regional organizations appeared to be impossible – in spite of the fact that 
the CU and especially the EEC mimic the EU in many important instances (Libman and 
Furman 2015). 
 The onset of the Ukrainian crisis changed this attitude. From 2015 on, the issue of 
negotiations between the EU and the EEU became frequent topic of discussion in the 
European politics, in particular in Germany. There seem to be two reasons why the EU-EEU 
dialogue is currently treated more seriously. First, some believe it to be a suitable reward for 
the Russian leadership to change its attitude towards Ukraine, particularly since it has been 
Putin himself who advocated a common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Second, 
the EU-EEU engagement could give a new forum to continue some form of economic 
dialogue with Russia even under current difficult circumstances, when many other formats of 
dialogue have been frozen and cannot be revived. Whether any of these perspectives is 
realistic, is debatable. In my opinion, treating the EU-EEU dialogue as a ‘carrot’ in Russia-
EU relations with respect to Ukraine is unlikely to produce any results, given the extreme 
importance Russia assigns to the perceived threats associated with the development in 
Ukraine, the general lack of interest of the Russian leadership towards trade liberalization and 
focus on protectionism and unclear outcome of any negotiations between two groupings, even 
if they were pursued. EU-EEU dialogue as a forum for discussions and solving specific 
economic issues in difficult times could be fruitful, particularly since countries like 
Kazakhstan and Belarus have a clear interest towards finding a reasonable way to sustain 
economic relations between Eurasia and Europe and would try to promote a cooperative 
approach. Since for the EU economic relations to Russia are still of crucial importance and 
have to be sustained and developed even in the current political environment, and most other 
dialogue formats, as mentioned, are on hold, there are obvious benefits for the European 
Union from initiating this dialogue as well. Furthermore, since the EEU is, even unlike other 
post-Soviet organizations, a highly a-political entity without any clear ideological guidelines 
and resolute focus on economic issues, engaging the EEU will not legitimize the Russian 
regime or will do so to the smallest extent possible of all other dialogue formats. While the 
dialogue will not solve the Ukrainian conflict, it could still contribute to achieving important 
economic goals of the EU and – in the long run – to the trust-building in Europe.3 
 As of now, it is unclear whether the EU-EEU dialogue will ever take place and in 
which form. If the situation in Ukraine calms down to a certain extent, such a dialogue would 
be more likely, but, of course, in no way certain. From the point of view of this paper, the 
most important aspect is the implications of this dialogue for the development of the Eurasian 
regionalism itself. Typically, when the EU engages in dialogues with regional organizations 
in other parts of the world, by the design of these dialogues its strengthens regional 
organizations and region-ness (for example, it has been typical for the EU-ASEAN dialogue, 
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 The literature is, however, strongly divided on the issue of likelihood and gains of the EU-EEU engagement; 
hence, the view presented above are clearly not part of any consensus. See Popescu 2014; Moshes 2014; Krastev 
and Leonard 2014; Dragneva and Wolczuk 2015. 
which played a certain role in ‘creating’ the South-East Asia region, see, e.g., Gilson 2005). 
In Eurasia, similar processes could occur. Furthermore, the EU-EEU dialogue would increase 
the value of the EEU for the member countries and, in particular, for Russia. From this point 
of view, the EEU-EEU dialogue would to some extent strengthen the perspectives of regional 
integration in Eurasia – though again, a lot of caution is required in evaluating the possibility 
and the prospects of such a dialogue.  
 
4. Russian economic crisis 
4.1. Crisis transmission 
The political crisis associated with the conflict in Ukraine coincided with a major economic 
crisis in Russia. The fact that Russia is entering a period of economic slowdown was evident 
already in 2013, before the onset of the political crisis. In the fall 2014, declining oil prices 
have shifted the Russian economy into a recession. International sanctions probably amplified 
the negative effect of the oil prices, although clearly have not been the main reason for 
Russia’s economic trouble. Most importantly, the crisis in Russia seems to have substantial 
implications for the economic development of other states of Eurasia – which in turn is likely 
to affect the future of the Eurasian regionalism. 
 In the previous discussion, I have referred to the Eurasian regionalism as a case of 
‘crisis-driven integration’, which became more likely due to the crisis of 2008-2011. The fact 
that crises can, generally speaking, promote regionalism, is not new to the literature (for a 
recent discussion see Lefkofridi and Schmitter 2015). In Eurasia, the main reason why crises 
have a positive impact on regionalism is the intensive economic ties between countries 
persisting from the Soviet era: it is more expensive for Eurasian countries to search for new 
trade partners and economic links than to keep the existing ties – therefore disintegration and 
search for alternative economic ties is more likely during the periods of growth and less likely 
amidst the economic turmoil. However, at the same time, crises also increase demand for 
protectionism, especially if lack of reserves forces the countries to attempt to extract rents 
through unilateral trade restrictions and competitive devaluations of national currencies. 
During the crisis of 1998, this second effect dominated, making Eurasian regionalism less 
likely; in 2008-2011, key Eurasian countries (Russia and Kazakhstan) accumulated 
substantial currency reserves, and the decline of the oil price has been very short-term; 
therefore, the first effect (the willingness to preserve economic ties) dominated and the 
creation of the CU became possible (Golovnin et al. 2013; Vinokurov and Libman 2014). 
Furthermore, unlike 1998, when Russia was hit by the crisis relatively early and became the 
source of risks of other countries through the Ruble devaluation, in 2008-2011 Kazakhstan 
was hit before Russia, and the Belarusian crisis was out of sync with the crisis in Kazakhstan 
and Russia.  
How does the situation look like from this perspective if we consider the development 
of the Russian crisis of 2014-2015? This time Russia is again the source of economic 
instability for its neighbors. Generally, it is possible to distinguish among five main channels 
of crisis transmission, which could be relevant for post-Soviet countries (Dabrowski 2015; 
Libman 2015a). 
• The devaluation of the Russian ruble is changing the terms of trade with the post-Soviet 
countries, increasing the competitiveness of the Russian goods. Since many post-Soviet 
states are linked to Russia through long-term economic ties based on well-established 
technological complementarities and thus will not be able to find substitute markets 
outside Eurasia – especially since establishing new economic ties requires additional 
investments, and it is more difficult to implement them amidst an economic crisis. 
• Remittances of labor migrants employed in Russia have become a major or an important 
source of revenue for the population of many countries of the region. The crisis is likely to 
reduce the demand for labor force in Russia or at least shift the salaries of migrants 
downwards. As a result, the flow of remittances is likely to go down. 
• Similarly, it is possible that the foreign direct investments by Russian companies, which 
played an important role in the past (EDB 2014a), could also go down in the years to 
come. It is not quite certain how the development will look like. During the crisis of 2008-
2009, Russian FDI went down, but to a smaller extent than foreign direct investments 
from other countries (Golovnin et al. 2013). There are reasons to expect Russian FDI to be 
rather resilient to the crisis of 2015 as well. Other factors could also play a role: first, the 
options of Russian companies outside Eurasia could go down to a greater extent than in 
the region (e.g., because of international sanctions), and second, Russia could try to keep 
its investment presence in the region for political reasons. Still, there is a chance that FDI 
could become another channel of crisis transmission. 
• Expectations of the population in Eurasian countries have been massively shaped by the 
developments in Russia. A crisis in Russia could cause currency panic or shifts in 
consumption in Eurasia as well: Belarus and Moldova experienced similar developments 
in late 2014 – early 2015. The reduction of the remittances flows could exacerbate this 
negative effect. 
• Many international investors still perceive Eurasia as an integrated region, which they 
develop their strategy for. A crisis in Russia could cause investors to reduce their presence 
in the region in general. Again, as of 2015, this effect is likely to be much weaker than in 
the past (Golovnin et al. 2013), but it should not be neglected. It is probably more likely to 
affect portfolio investments; but also FDI may experience similar risks. In addition, many 
companies used Russia as a ‘springboard’ for entering the Eurasian countries in the past, 
but using Russian experience (and, possibly, Russian personnel). This option is likely to 
become less attractive in the future as well. 
The extent of the crisis will determine the change of Russian reserves and the reserves of 
other post-Soviet countries. If the oil prices continue to be low, oil-rich exporters like 
Kazakhstan will face the problem of decreasing reserves and public revenue irrespectively of 
the crisis, but it will also increase their willingness to implement protectionist measures 
against Russia. Russia itself is likely to suffer significant reduction of budgetary revenue not 
only because of oil prices, but also because of the EU and the US sanctions. Thus, in both 
Russia and other countries of Eurasia the demand for protectionism is likely to go up, as 
opposed to the crisis of 2008-2009: this will certainly damage the perspectives of Eurasian 
integration. 
 
4.2. Implications for Eurasian regionalism 
The pressure of the crisis creates three major risks for the Eurasian integration. First, domestic 
economic problems are likely to make countries particularly willing to extract revenue by 
taxing cross-border transactions or by stimulating competitive currency devaluations to 
increase the exports. Second, countries could use protectionist barriers to defend their markets 
from the Russian goods. In case tariff or non-tariff constraints are imposed (in spring 2015 
there has been discussion about Kazakhstan implementing this type of constraints, but as of 
this moment (April 2015) it has resulted in any action), it clearly runs contrary to the 
obligations within the CU and the EEU. In case national currencies are devaluated to match 
the devaluation of ruble, it leads to macroeconomic imbalances and again increases risks for 
regionalism. Third, the economic crisis is likely to increase the risks of manipulation and non-
compliance by the key member of the Eurasian regional organizations – Russia, for which 
domestic challenges (e.g., dissatisfaction of the population) could become more important 
than meeting its obligations in the EEU. For other countries this problem is likely to matter as 
well.  
From this point of view, one of the least predictable dimensions of the impact of the 
crisis on Eurasian integration is the possible change of public perception of Eurasian 
regionalism. Before the crisis, as the surveys by Eurasian Development Bank (EDB 2013, 
2014b) show, Eurasian regionalism enjoyed general support in most countries of Eurasia. 
However, there have been many critical voices during this period as well, attributing 
economic difficulties countries faced to the ‘Russia-induced’ regional organization. During 
the crisis these critical voices could become more important. Public dissatisfaction could also 
focus not on the Eurasian regionalism itself, but rather on specific processes associated with 
economic integration in Eurasia. In Russia, for example, one could expect the public to 
become even more xenophobic than it was before and therefore willing to support restrictions 
on labor migration, which would contradict the interests of other Eurasian countries like 
Tajikistan, Armenia or Kyrgyzstan, for which their current or potential participation in the 
EEU is attractive precisely because of certain liberalization of labor migration.  
In some countries of Eurasia an alternative strategy to what has been described above 
is subject to active discussion – precisely during the current crisis situation more active 
involvement in the EEU project could be seen as a tool to get access to the Russian market 
and to improve conditions for migrants (Gröne and Hett 2015). This outcome, probably, is 
more likely for smaller countries with limited outside options, which also have no domestic 
industry or economy they could try to protect or exports they could try to support through 
unilateral mercantilist policies. For larger countries (especially Kazakhstan) this approach 
does not seem to be likely, and it was primarily the cooperation between two large countries – 
Russia and Kazakhstan – which made the progress of the CU possible. 
Summing up, economic crisis in Russia certainly increases risks for the Eurasian 
integration. It will make the large countries key to the integration project more protectionist 
and unwilling to accept free trade regime or uphold their obligations in the Eurasian 
regionalism. While the importance of already established intra-regional economic ties will be 
larger during the crisis, these ties will also become crisis transmission channels from Russia 
to other Eurasian countries, making the idea of Eurasian integration even less popular. 
Finally, the crisis could potentially jeopardize the political stability of Eurasian countries - 
with unpredictable consequences for the region in general.  
 
5. Outlook: EEU treaty and beyond 
Our discussion suggested a rather gloomy picture of Eurasian regionalism. With the exception 
of the possible EU-EEU dialogue (which, as of now, remains a remote and uncertain 
perspective) and the greater willingness of Russia to accept political compromises with other 
states of Eurasia, most other factors suggest that Eurasian countries should become less 
willing and able to advance regional integration. From this point of view, three questions 
become important. First, should we expect formal disintegration of Eurasian regional 
organizations? Second, does the described development mean that Eurasia will return to the 
state of ‘ink-on-paper’ integration rhetoric? Third, are there any areas where in spite of these 
problems integration could develop in the years to come? We will look at these questions one 
by one. 
 Disintegration still remains an unlikely scenario for both advanced organizations like 
the EEU and shallow alliances like the CIS. As for the CIS, even countries like Ukraine value 
numerous technical agreements (e.g., about recognition of university degrees, pension status 
etc.), which are all linked to the CIS.4 The costs of participating in this organization are purely 
symbolic, so there is little need to support disintegration. As for the EEU, the effort invested 
by the member states in creating the organization and the sunk costs associated with it are too 
high to make formal disintegration an attractive solution. Besides, formal disintegration 
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would probably be perceived as a public humiliation by Russian leadership and may cause 
negative response (e.g., economic pressure). Finally, leaders of almost all EEU members use 
the idea of post-Soviet integration as one of the tools legitimizing their rule – since they have 
done it for decades, it will not be easy for them to reverse course in this matter. 
 Deepening the scope of the EEU or expanding its membership is equally unlikely. As 
of now, five countries joined the EEU: Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
Kyrgyzstan. It leaves only one possible candidate to the organization – Tajikistan, which is 
oriented towards Russia in its foreign policy and could benefit from even limited mobility of 
labor in the EEU. It is hardly imaginable that Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia will ever join the 
EEU – for political reasons, but also because their association agreements with the EU 
preclude them from undertaking such a step from a purely legal perspective (DCFTA is 
incompatible with the provisions of the CU). Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan opted 
for non-alignment and, given the controversies in the contemporary Eurasia, are unlikely to 
revise this decision – the only exception is Uzbekistan, where unexpected policy changes 
could occur after death of the current leader.  
The perspectives of deepening the cooperation could be assessed based on the 
experience associated with signing the EEU treaty, which occurred already amidst the 
political crisis. The treaty was signed in May 2014 and basically represents a codification of 
the already existing CU provisions, as well as of the Common Economic Space (a set of 
agreements on factor movement liberalization and coordination of economic policies signed 
in 2012). Furthermore, the treaty suggests that in the future the EEU countries will liberalize a 
number of sensitive areas, including energy markets and medicines, liberalize trade in 
services and create a common financial supervision authority. These steps are not automatic 
and require further negotiations; there are good reasons to doubt that they will actually be 
implemented. Kazakhstani representatives made sure that no political integration provisions 
were included in the EEU treaty – this policy, as mentioned, was consistently pursued by 
Kazakhstan already before the crisis. Belarus agreed to sign only in exchange for further 
indirect subsidies through redistribution of revenue from Russian raw oil export duties. 
Schenkkan (2015), looking at an earlier draft of the EEU treaty and the final version of the 
treaty, shows that all three member states introduced changes diminishing the capacity of the 
EEU and the scope of integration. 
Thus, it looks like the countries of Eurasia have already achieved a plateau in their 
integration process – further deepening of the EEU is unlikely. It is very possible, however, 
that this plateau would be achieved without the crisis as well – for example, because countries 
would be too concerned to become politically dependent on Russia, because contradictions 
between members would be too large or because the credibility of new commitments would 
be too low. At the same time, already achieved level of regional integration within the EEU 
should not be under-estimated – customs unions with multiple additional provisions are a 
complex integration form, which only few regions of the world are able to implement. The 
central question and the point of debate for observers is whether this form will be de-facto 
sustained, or, while continuing to use integration rhetoric, Eurasian countries will return to the 
well-established approach of rhetorical cooperation.  
There are two arguments against the expectation of purely rhetorical approach to 
regionalism – an empirical and a theoretical. Empirically, the negotiations of the EEU treaty 
show that countries actually take the agreement seriously, since they attempt to change it to 
limit the power of the EEU. If they treated the EEU as purely rhetorical, they would (as they 
did in case of the CIS) agree to any most ambitious integration scheme. Theoretically, the 
costs of dismantling the functioning cooperation are high, and it is not clear whether countries 
would accept them during a crisis. At the same time, there is also an argument in favor of a 
rhetorical approach: it could offer the countries the best combination between showing loyalty 
to Russia and reducing Russian influence, which became much more threatening after the 
Ukrainian crisis started. In this way, countries would reduce to the same approach they used 
in the 1990s, when their sovereignty was uncertain and dependence on Russia was very high.  
Most likely, one will observe a combination of both – some level of functional 
cooperation and some level of rhetorical cooperation. The proportion in which these two 
components will be mixed into the EEU will depend on the development of both crises I 
discussed in this paper, as well as whether the EEU will affect issues countries consider 
critically important. I have shown that for Russia such an issue has been the counter-sanctions 
against the EU. In the future, if Russia decides to impose sanctions against Ukraine, they 
could also become such an issue where violations of the EEU rules will be considered as 
acceptable. Other EEU countries have similar issues as well: for example, while the EEU 
indirectly stipulates that Armenia has to establish customs borders complying with the EEU 
rules at the border of Nagorny Karabakh (as the country was specifically required while 
joining the EEU), it is very unlikely that Armenia will actually do it – relations to Nagorny 
Karabak are critical for this country. 
 
6. Conclusion 
It remains to summarize the key conclusions of this article. Both crises developing in Eurasia 
– the political crisis around Ukraine and the economic crisis in Russia – will have mostly 
negative implications for the EEU. Political crisis will make smaller EEU members more 
concerned about excessive Russian influence and dependence on Russia. Economic crisis will 
make countries willing to avoid transmission of economic problems from Russia, and at the 
same time will deplete these countries reserves and budget revenues, making them more 
inclined to use protectionist and mercantilist policies to generate additional revenue. At the 
same time, the crisis made it even more important for Russia to maintain the EEU – as a 
result, Russia may be more willing to compromise and to accept demands of other member 
states. 
 The disintegration and the substantial expansion and deepening of the EEU are both 
very unlikely scenarios (possibly, even without both crises further advancement of the EEU 
were impossible due to political and structural constraints the countries of the region face). As 
of now, it seems likely that the EEU will maintain some level of functioning cooperation, 
while in some other areas it would shift into more rhetorical ‘ink-on-paper’ regional 
organization. If this will be the case, the EEU will remain an important and relatively 
advanced regional organization – while it cannot be compared with the EU in terms of the 
level of regional integration, it already has achieved quite a lot, so that just preserving it will 
make the EEU economically and politically relevant.  But the extent to which rhetorical 
cooperation will dominate and the functioning cooperation will disappear is unclear. 
Finally, one has to notice that the development of the EEU – as well as other processes 
in Eurasia – remains highly uncertain due to high uncertainty of the future path of both crises 
I discussed in this paper. Nobody is able to make clear predictions as to how crises will 
develop; and, therefore, any forecasts of the future of Eurasian regionalism (including those 
implemented in this paper) should be treated with caution.  
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